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Article

Against Personal Ventilator Reallocation
JOEL MICHAEL REYNOLDS, LAURA GUIDRY-GRIMES, and KATIE SAVIN
Abstract: The COVID-19 (Coronavirus disease of 2019) pandemic has led to intense conversations about ventilator allocation and reallocation during a crisis standard of care. Multiple
voices in the media and multiple state guidelines mention reallocation as a possibility.
Drawing upon a range of neuroscientific, phenomenological, ethical, and sociopolitical
considerations, the authors argue that taking away someone’s personal ventilator is a direct
assault on their bodily and social integrity. They conclude that personal ventilators should
not be part of reallocation pools and that triage protocols should be immediately clarified to
explicitly state that personal ventilators will be protected in all cases.
Keywords: COVID-19; medical rationing; disability; ventilators; bodily integrity;
pandemics
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Introduction
The Coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic has led to intense conversations
about ventilator allocation and reallocation during a crisis standard of care (CSC).
The ethical value of maximizing lives saved in a pandemic has received widespread
support from clinicians and bioethicists for years, so much so that some consider it a
fundamental tenet of public health ethics. In the last few months, however,
approaches that prioritize maximization of life have received repeated and notable
challenges.1 One reason for such pushback is the implication that patients who
could benefit from a ventilator might have the ventilator withheld or withdrawn if
triage officers/teams decide that more patients could be saved by taking it from
them.2 This reasoning could extend to ventilators outside the hospital setting; if more
lives could be saved by taking advantage of chronic-use ventilators in the community,
then it would follow that these ventilators should be part of allocation schemas.
This is not a mere academic point. The Food and Drug Administration issued
guidance for modifying home- and facility-use ventilators as needed for the COVID19 pandemic.3 In New York, the federal government continually refused to provide
needed support and the COVID-19 pandemic overwhelmed hospitals so severely
that Governor Cuomo authorized the National Guard to take control of excess
community ventilators, announcing his plan in an April briefing that caused some
alarm.4 As another example, multiple hospitals approached a nursing home in Long
Island, requesting access to unused ventilators; the first hospital to make the request
received 11 ventilators, leaving the facility with only 5 on hand for current and
future residents.5 Even outside of New York, healthcare systems globally must find
ways to increase supplies and plan for CSC.
Bioethicists, healthcare professionals, and public agencies must pay attention to
this concern and clarify promptly: Are personal ventilators (PVs) part of the
Acknowledgments: We extend our thanks to the many activists and scholars who have hosted webinars
and other events to share the insights and experiences of the disability community during the Covid-19
pandemic.
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reallocation pool during a pandemic like COVID-19, or not? In this paper, we focus
on the primary ethical question that underlies such a decision: should they be or not?
We argue that PVs should not be part of reallocation pools and that triage
protocols should be immediately clarified and explicitly state that PVs will be
protected in all cases. As important as we take our primary argument to be, we
take the issues raised by personal ventilator reallocation (PVR) to have biomedical,
ethical, and philosophical import far beyond crisis standards of care in the time of
COVID-19. First, as we will discuss at length, there is an urgent moral need for
explicit policies concerning ventilator reallocation at the institutional, state, and
federal level. Second, PVR raises crucial symbolic issues concerning the historically
fraught relationship between the norms of biomedical and public health practices
and the needs and wellbeing of the larger disability community.6
We begin by analyzing phenomenological, neuroscientific, ethical, and sociopolitical considerations pertaining to the experience of long-term ventilator users,
the analysis of which leads us to argue that ventilators should be considered as an
integrated technology: a technology that is essential to one’s functioning across the life
course and part of one’s social identity. We then discuss the ways in which
integrated technologies such as ventilators have become powerful symbols concerning the worth of disabled lives amidst this political and existential crisis.
Heeding the fact that multiple values are at play when CSC are triggered, in the
next section, we analyze four potential scenarios of PVR during a pandemic as well as
the ethical considerations of each. In conclusion, we discuss the larger implications
of our argument that reallocating PVs under any circumstances grossly violates
bodily and social integrity and conflicts with longstanding biomedical principles
and guidelines.
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The Background of PVR Debates
For the purposes of our discussion, the acronym “PV” refers to ventilators that
individuals use in their homes, whether that be private homes in a community or in
long-term care environments, such as group homes and nursing homes. A person’s
financial relationship to these ventilators may differ—for example, one might rent,
borrow, or own their ventilators, and this relationship is likely mediated by health
insurance. Some bioethicists suggest that whether a ventilator is “rented from a
device company” and whether there is “legal ownership” are ethically salient for
claims to the ventilator during a pandemic.7 For reasons we defend below, we take
the nature of the financial relationship to be immaterial to the personal sense of
ownership that a ventilator user experiences and the ethical considerations thereof.
The possibility of PVR through a triage process is a source of profound concern for
people who rely on ventilators in their everyday life. Alice Wong, a disability
activist and a long-term vent user, explains this concern: “Were I to contract
coronavirus, I imagine a doctor might read my chart, look at me, and think I’m a
waste of their efforts and precious resources that never should have been in shortage
to begin with. He might even take my ventilator for other patients who have a better
shot at survival than me.”8 Although states and individual institutions vary in their
PVR policies,9 discussion of PVR has been covered in the media and implanted as a
concern in disability communities. The introduction of this possibility—that one
could go to the hospital to receive acute care services and end up without access to
the life-sustaining device that they have constant access to at home—is a valid

273

Joel Michael Reynolds et al.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0963180120000833 Published online by Cambridge University Press

deterrent to going to the hospital when otherwise necessary. Moreover, silence on
an issue during a public health crisis can be decisive; the nature of a crisis is such
that, without clear guardrails, options that are ethically problematic can remain on
the table in policy discussions and then lead to action. As a result, we contend that
there can no longer be neutral, or assumed, defaults in ventilator triage policies.
Our analysis is part of a debate that has existed for over a decade about how
chronic-use ventilators should factor into triage decisions during a public health
disaster. The 2009 Guidance for Establishing Crisis Standards of Care for Use in
Disaster Situations by the Institute of Medicine (now National Academy of Medicine) describes early stages of this debate. According to this report, the World Health
Organization at the time argued that “chronic-care patients should be included with
all other patients in triage protocols, holding that all must share the sacrifice
involved in triage equally,” whereas the Veterans Health Administration “found
that viable ethical arguments could support either position,” although they ultimately chose to exclude PVs from reallocation.10
Recently in The New York Times, Ari Ne’eman claimed that the 2015 New York
triage guidelines would “permit hospitals to take away ventilators from those who
use them on an ongoing basis in the community or at a long-term care facility if they
seek hospital care.”11 Joseph Fins, who served on the Task Force responsible for
these guidelines, refuted this characterization of the Task Force’s recommended
ventilator reallocation process. The exchange between Ne’eman and Fins underscores the importance of clarity and transparency.12 In the past few months,
complaints of disability discrimination in triage protocols in Kansas and
New York were submitted to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
Office of Civil Rights, explicitly asking for protection of PVs from reallocation.13
Months into the COVID-19 pandemic, the New England Journal of Medicine published
a perspective piece that advises against PVR in light of disability discrimination
complaints, although the ethical reasons for this recommendation are ultimately left
unaddressed—the comment is instead a single sentence assertion.14 Other bioethicists have left it an open question to what extent PVR should be permitted, raising
some doubts about “legitimate” claims and expectations of PV users.15
What is the Lived Experience of a PV?
One of the more established values of medical practice is respect for patient autonomy, including respect for patients' bodily integrity. Although there are many gray
areas in medicine, it is typically taken as a given that infringing on a patient’s bodily
integrity should only occur under exceptional circumstances. Yet, what if a patient’s
body extends beyond the skin? Is a guide dog part of a patient’s body? What about an
implanted cardioverter-defibrillator or a cochlear implant? This is the dilemma faced
by people who live with ventilators: will medical professionals view their ventilator as
a part of their body and something to be carefully respected or as a mere object they
use that can be taken away? It is hard to overstate the personal terror wrought from
the suggestion that PVs could be taken away in a triage process, but to fully appreciate
why this causes such terror requires better understanding the lived experience of longterm ventilator users. If medical providers, health policy experts, and others who play
a role in decision-making concerning PVR wish to make informed and ethically
defensible decisions, then attention to how long-term ventilator users experience their
ventilator must be heeded.
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Recent neuroscientific studies suggest that the multisensory mechanisms representing peripersonal space do not depend merely upon bodily activity or upon
active use of nonbodily items such as tools. On the contrary, peripersonal space is a
question of the processing of information resulting from organism–environment
interactions. For example, Galli et al., who focus on the use of a wheelchair, argue
that a wheelchair “can be conceived as a whole body tool, enabling extended
interaction between the person and the environment, thus extending peripersonal
space boundaries.”16 However, they note that “counter-intuitively, such effect was
not induced by active use of the wheelchair in healthy participants who never used a
wheelchair before (even if they subjectively reported to “embody” the wheelchair)”
(idem). Tellingly, to merely use an object for some discrete period of time is not
sufficient for it to become a part of the proprioceptive sensing of an organism.17 That
is to say, there is a crucial distinction between using an artifact, becoming habituated
to using an artifact, and having become habituated to using it to the point of
incorporating it into one’s experience of one’s body itself.18 Seen in this light, longterm ventilator use is not ultimately a question of becoming habituated to the use of
a ventilator, but instead of bodily incorporation of the ventilator.
Still, this argument alone does not decide the matter of PVR. We are not primarily
concerned with whether a person senses or perceives their ventilator as a part of their
body, but, instead, whether or not such a sensation can act as the foundation of a
moral claim that removing their ventilator is a harm, including a harm that infringes
on their bodily integrity. That is to say, as insightful as phenomenological and
biological insights are, they do not, on their own, answer the ethical problem
at hand.
To answer that question requires a different analytic toolset. Consider the widely
used distinction between curative and assistive technologies. Curative technologies
are typically taken to be technological artifacts that contribute to a person’s shift
toward comparatively “normal” or “healthy” forms of being, whereas assistive
technologies are typically taken to be merely additive and helpful with respect to
how one is. In “The Distinction Between Curative and Assistive Technology,”
Joseph Stramondo argues that this distinction is untenable if thought in terms of
an extensional or intentional definition.19 The reason for this is that the meaning of
the technologies in question does not turn on what the respective concepts are taken
to pick out, but instead upon the relationship that a given technology has to one’s
“relational narrative identity as a member of one of two social groups: disabled people
or nondisabled people.”20 Stramondo’s claims situate social and dialogical factors
relative to politicized identities as definitive—as opposed to biological, phenomenological, and psychological factors.
This is an insightful argument in many respects, but we wonder whether it
appropriately extends to the case at hand. Does the permanent use of a ventilator
turn, when all is said and done, solely on the story one tells about oneself and/or
which others tell about one? It seems as though the distinction between therapeutic
and assistive technology as tethered to relational narrative identity is insufficient to
fully capture the normative dimensions of the use of a technology like a long-term
ventilator.
We suggest that the meaning of a ventilator for a long-term ventilator user should
instead be construed neither in terms of a therapeutic, nor assistive technology, but
instead in terms of what we call an integrated technology. More specifically, it is a
corporeally integrated technology. Although the meaning of a ventilator for a long-term
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user is certainly determined by their relational narrative identity, as Stramondo’s
work rightly suggests, the moral stakes of the relationship between the user and the
ventilator is not reducible to that.21 This is because without this technology, the
person would die or would be thrown into a medically dangerous situation. This is
part of the reason that ventilators should be treated as prima facie morally distinct
from other sorts of similar technologies. Let us unpack this argument further.
In his essay, “Prosthetic Embodiment,” Sean Aas argues that dominant accounts
of the moral status of prosthetic or other sorts of bodily extensions fail to motivate
expected normative concerns—they do not tell us why we should care about
damaging or taking away someone’s prosthetic leg, for example, in the ways that
most would expect.22 After analyzing why phenomenological, neuroscientific, and
biological accounts, such as we are analyzing here, fail to provide such ethical
considerations—why they do not tell us how we should distinguish between morally
meaningful bodily and nonbodily parts—Aas articulates a solution: “to be a body
part is to be the sort of thing that ought to be protected, in a certain way, by social
practices.”
The question then immediately arises: which practices support which sort of social
practices in question? “Following arguments from Anita Silvers and other philosophers of disability,” Aas continues, “the thing that social institutions ought to
protect, in this bodily way, are those things that are critical to our functioning as
equals in our actual social world” (idem). But the philosophical weight is then left on
the adjective “critical.” And, furthermore, Aas’ response does not substantively
address questions of how we adjudicate debates over what is critical and noncritical.
This is understandable for such debates are storied and difficult. Consider the
following phenomena: personal computer use, equal representation within a democratic republic, the ability to metabolize the amino acid phenylalanine, access to
basic healthcare services, prostheses for lower-limb amputees, and eyeglasses. To
determine which of these “are critical to our functioning as equals in our actual
social world” and which are not goes to the heart of debates over justice and equity
and which—assuming one is operating under real, nonideal conditions—are very
hard to answer.
We think, however, that Aas in fact offers a path forward later on in the paper. In a
footnote addressing Carter and Palermos’ work on the ethics of extended cognition,
he distinguishes between “acts that ought to count as offenses against the person
because they are interference with items that realize cognition” versus those items that
“interfere in cognition.” Switching from the issue of cognition to pulmonary
functioning, a ventilator, for a long-term user, is not something which merely
interferes (positively) in pulmonary function, but which realizes livable pulmonary
function for them. To bring together both Stramondo’s and Aas’s analyses, then, we
can say that what it means to call a ventilator an integrated technology is as follows:
integrated technologies are essential to one’s functioning, not merely in acute
situations, but across one’s future life course, and they are part of one’s relational
narrative identity.
Someone might object that there could be a long-term ventilator user who resents
using their ventilator, who feels alienated from this equipment. Instead of being part
of the story they tell about themselves, it is a facet of their life they downplay, ignore,
or otherwise diminish. Yet, even in such a case, it is a part of their relational narrative
identity—they have to tell a story about it. Refusing to tell that story or to incorporate
various aspects of it does not mean that the story or the parts in question are not
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constitutive, on at least some integral level, of one’s larger identity—again, even if
through refusal or active denial. The ventilator shapes daily interactions and the
conditions for living, making a narrative relationship with it mandatory.
Another reason why a ventilator has to be part of one’s relational narrative
identity, even if through the mode of refusal, is that it is not simply functionally
essential, but it is so in a socially obtrusive way.23 Ventilators, based on current
technologies, cannot be hidden; on the contrary, ventilators are the sort of thing that
one has to explain or that are simply taken as an aspect of another’s relational identity,
even if that persons wishes them not to be so, as discussed above.
It is for all these reasons that a ventilator for a long-term user is in many respects
categorically different from other sorts of medical technology. Given these neuroscientific, phenomenological, ethical, and interpersonal reasons, taking a ventilator
away from a long-term user is more akin to taking away a part of their body and a part
of their identity. That is to say, it is more akin to violating both bodily and what we
term “social integrity” than it is to taking away a device that someone merely “uses.”
Still, someone might object that this account does not hold for someone who
recently started using a long-term ventilator. This objection assumes that the
meaning of the ventilator for that person begins at the moment they start using it,
but this assumption is misguided. A person who ends up using a long-term
ventilator is unlikely to have that option presented to them out of the blue. On
the contrary, they were likely on a complicated medical trajectory that led up to their
use of such a device. Being discharged with a long-term ventilator is part of a process
that most people would have been on for quite some time. Although the harm
against someone who has been using a long-term ventilator for a few hours or days
would certainly be different in degree than someone who has been using one for
10 or 20 years, we contend that it would not ultimately be different in kind—
specifically given the way in which long-term ventilator use constitutes an integrated technology as we have defined that term.
To summarize, what commits us to grant moral status to objects such as
ventilators for long-term users, artifacts that are admittedly not prima facie part
of one’s “biological” body, is whether or not they are integrated in the sense of both
participating in and realizing the essential functions of their biological life and the
narrative relational identity of their social life. Following Aas, we leave the ultimate
meaning of “essential” (or, as he terms it, “critical”) undefined in any technical sense
and following Stramondo, we leave the ultimate meaning of “identity” similarly
undefined in any technical sense, but we do so because we think that further
specifications of those terms do not undermine our central argument. To put things
in an overly simplistic manner, it is neither up for debate that the ability to breathe is
essential for human organisms, nor that extrinsic, socially conspicuous devices
affording such essential abilities will become a part of the story one and others tells
about oneself.
The research we have engaged and the arguments we have put forward lead us to
the following conclusion: taking away someone’s ventilator is a direct assault on their
bodily and social integrity. It is morally akin to taking away a part of their physical
body and a part of their social identity. Respect for patient autonomy as well as
bodily and social integrity demands that PVs not be taken from those who use them.
Even replacements of ventilator devices—due to conditions where shifting to a
different type of ventilator device is medically indicated—should be done in careful
consultation with patients.
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As far as these arguments take us, they do not address an equally important
consideration: the public, symbolic importance of debates over and decisions
concerning PVR. It is one thing to claim that PVR is wrong from a biomedical or
philosophical lens; it is another to appreciate the harms that even suggestions of
PVR can cause at the larger level of public discourse and the public imaginary,
especially in light of centuries of disregard, disparagement, and far worse forms of
treatment of numerous communities of people with disabilities both in the United
States and abroad.24
In this light, it is no surprise that ventilators have become a focal point of resource
triage debates and advocacy in many disability communities and have in many
ways taken on symbolic meaning amounting to the perception of one’s social worth
—whether people are “worth saving” and whether they live “lives worth living,” to
invoke the language of the Third Reich’s T4 program.25 As horror stories emerged
from Italy about ventilator shortages and the painful act of deciding who would or
would not receive a ventilator were recounted, the prospect of triaging ventilators
was highly anticipated in the United States. The pandemic has underscored and
compounded long-standing health inequities in the United States, especially in
Black and Latinx communities, including lack of access to testing and health
information; lack of access to routine, primary care, and increased exposure to the
virus due to lack of personal protective equipment (PPE) and disproportionate
numbers of frontline, “essential” workers.26 Still, public discourse and broadly
publicized communication among elected officials have continued to highlight
not the role of systemic inequality and measures to address it, but instead concerns
about supply-side issues such as PPE and ventilator access. The outsized presence of
ventilators in the media magnifies their symbolism as the machine that gives access
to life when all else is lost. New York Governor Andrew Cuomo declared in midMarch, 2020, “Ventilators are to this war what missiles were to World War II,”
adding a touch of patriotism to the state’s efforts to procure ventilators.27
The COVID-19 pandemic is not the first time that breathing has taken on greater
meaning than its mechanical function. In the case of the brutal murder of unarmed
Black man Eric Garner in New York City in 2014, police put Mr. Garner in a choke
hold that suffocated him. Videos of the attack recorded his final words, “I cannot
breathe,” a phrase which he repeated 11 times as he was choked to death.28 Later,
when swells of outraged people filled the streets protesting the senseless killing,
these three words were repeated as rallying cries, on signs, and as a protest
hashtag on social media. Again in 2020, when Minneapolis police suffocated
another unarmed Black man, George Floyd, the scene was recorded by video
and his last words reverberated across the nation: “I cannot breathe.”29 The words
became a rallying cry again, representing the systematic denial of breath and
therefore life.
Air, lungs, breathing and, now, ventilators have long been symbols for essential
life and hope. Once used as a means of determining death, the ability to breathe is a
fundamental part of human life.30 Although biomedical advancement from the iron
lung to the ventilator has provided alternative mechanisms for exchanging oxygen
and carbon dioxide, one’s capacity to breathe is so fundamental to life it remains one
indicator for brain death.31 In Sontag’s discussion of the metaphors associated with
tuberculosis, she suggests a “disease of the lung” is a “disease of the soul,” so that
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even in its metaphoric form, the organ responsible for breathing is allencompassing.32
Thus, any discussion of ventilators is inevitably going to provoke strong reactions. As this pandemic has exposed deep societal inequities, discussions of triage
protocol related to social identities, such as that of disability, may seem like a
referendum on the worth of the lives of these groups. Discourse throughout this
pandemic has continually rendered disabled communities as other, and also often as
lesser, than the nondisabled, working-age adult. At the start of the pandemic, news
reports repeatedly assured listeners that “only older people and people with
underlying conditions” have suffered critical illness and deaths from COVID-19.
In response, many disabled activists wrote critiques with sarcastic comments such
as, “Do they not know we can read?”33
Similarly, the discussions about PVR struck fear into long-term ventilator users
and their loved ones that rippled across disability communities. The fact that PVs
were ever a point of contention is not likely to be forgotten, especially if triage
protocols never explicitly state that PVs are protected from reallocation. In order to
work toward establishing trust in healthcare systems—which is an important
component of health equity in the present and for the future—the collective trauma
of the COVID-19 pandemic needs to be a part of our decisionmaking both today and
going forward. For disability communities, this may mean understanding the fears
that may arise around accessing basic care and making explicit policies that rebuke
particularly charged ideas, such as PVR.
Public health officials, bioethicists, and healthcare providers must contend with
the realities of the ventilator as a symbol of life and worth, while not over-focusing
on ventilators in a pandemic response to the detriment of increasing access to more
basic primary care and PPE. The task for public health messaging is to reframe the
meaning of a ventilator as a tool that may help in limited, specific, situations, yet is
not in and of itself indicative of quality of care. There are many challenges facing
disabled people during this pandemic, and there will be many challenges when the
world starts to recover. Now that we have detailed a number of arguments and
considerations objecting to the reallocation of PVs, we will turn to address specific
scenarios in which the demand for reallocation may arise and explore in far more
detail how, in our view, clinicians and providers should respond.
Cases for Consideration
To better understand how CSC might lead to a PV user not having access to a
ventilator during a pandemic like COVID-19, and to make our analysis and
recommendations more concrete, we lay out the following four scenarios.
Scenario 1
Ventilators intended for chronic use outside of the hospital setting could be
acquisitioned by hospital systems that are desperate. Local authorities could ask
chronic-care facilities to hand over ventilators to shore up dire shortages. This
acquisition could focus on excess ventilators, that is, those not in use. Alternatively,
all of the ventilators in these facilities could be considered part of the allocation/
reallocation pool, even subjecting residents of chronic-care facilities to a triage
process.
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Whether retrieving excess ventilators from facilities is ethically permissible would
depend on whether this would place undue burden on care facilities that will likely
need those ventilators. Without them, facilities may be less able to take new residents
(which causes a discharge problem for hospitals), and they may not be able to replace
faulty ventilators (creating a precarious threat to current ventilator users in the
facility). A reciprocity agreement between the requesting hospital(s) and the facility
could help mitigate these concerns. Government agencies should explicitly give
chronic care facilities the freedom to opt out of these arrangements, which means
giving some protection against negative repercussions to facilities’ funding and
public relations if they refuse. If a facility does decide to share their excess ventilators,
there should be continual communication and evaluation of the facility’s needs, and
there should be clear triggers for returning ventilators back to the facility to prevent
time lags that lead to devastating consequences for vulnerable facility residents.
Making all chronic-use ventilators part of the reallocation pool has been longconsidered ethically impermissible for several reasons. The 2009 IOM/NAM report
points out that it would require an unacceptable role reversal for facility caregivers
and would cause brutal and unjust harm to persons with disabilities.34 The
New York State Task Force and Life and Law Report argues: “To triage patients
in chronic-care facilities once the Guidelines are implemented may theoretically
maximize resources and result in more lives saved, but conflicts with the societal
norm of defending vulnerable individuals and communities.” They add, “this
approach fails to follow the ethical principle of duty to care and could be construed
as taking advantage of a very vulnerable population.”35
The COVID-19 pandemic has seen this debate resurface, but we agree with the
New York Task Force that PV users in facilities should not be subjected to
reallocation for the reasons they suggest, further bolstered by our concerns for
bodily and social integrity.36 One could counter that PVR in this scenario can be
ethically acceptable—perhaps even obligatory—when the resident is in a prolonged
vegetative state; this disorder of consciousness might seem to preclude the possibility of the patient ever having a sense of personal ownership over the ventilator. In
a public health crisis, therefore, it might seem sensible to reallocate ventilators for
this particular population, so more patients in acute need can be saved in the
pandemic. We now know, although, that vegetative states are commonly misdiagnosed, and recovery can be possible; permanent vegetative states are no longer even
accepted as a nosological category.37 Furthermore, the issue of the protection and
medical care of people in such states, however, medically defined, goes to the heart
of disability rights.38 Safeguarding the rights to care and recovery of this vulnerable
population is therefore still a fundamental obligation of healthcare professionals
and caregiving facilities, and our concerns about bodily and social integrity remain.
Scenario 2
Whenever a patient comes into the hospital with their PV, the patient might no
longer be allowed to “lay claim” to that ventilator. The ventilator becomes part of
the allocation pool for the public good, and the patient might not have their
ventilator returned to them.
Objections to any such policy are justified.39 This would be akin to seizing
someone’s vital organ for public use, for all the reasons we have detailed. This
leaves people who are dependent on their ventilator little choice but to avoid the
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hospital at all costs, especially if the triage criteria mean that they might not receive
ventilator support during their hospitalization. Furthermore, this scenario would
likely cause enormous moral distress for clinicians. To our knowledge, no hospital is
considering commandeering PVs, even under CSC. Given the immense fear surrounding this possibility, hospitals should immediately allay these concerns through
policies that explicitly eliminate this possibility.

Scenario 3
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Someone who relies on a PV for chronic care could be admitted to the hospital.
Hospital-based healthcare workers are generally not trained to use home ventilator
equipment, so they may want to switch out the PV for a hospital ventilator. The
hospital’s ventilator may be functionally equivalent to the home ventilator and the
patient’s respiratory support adequately provided by either the PV or the hospital
ventilator.
The patient should be consulted about their preferences regarding switching out
ventilators in this scenario, given pervasive fears about PV confiscation under CSC.
Especially if the type of ventilator in question is scarce, the default should be to work
with the patient’s own ventilator. This would be a departure of standard practice,
since usually patients do not use their own equipment when they enter the hospital
setting, even if they are functionally comparable. If the hospital cannot accommodate continued use of the PV for that particular patient, the PV should be placed in
protected storage; even if the PV could be cleaned and repurposed for other patients,
the PV should be treated like other personal items and not used without the patient’s
explicit consent. A ventilator-sharing system could be ethically supportable if a PV
user cannot continue to use their ventilator and another patient would benefit in
conditions of scarcity, but this system needs numerous safeguards to ensure that
sharing is voluntary and that the PV does not remain in use so long that the PV user
has delayed discharge as a result. If a patient’s needs are best served by having their
own caregiver at the hospital, this should be accommodated to the extent possible.

Scenario 4
A PV user could be admitted to the hospital and develop acute respiratory distress
syndrome (ARDS) from COVID-19 or another condition. In this scenario, the
medical team would recommend switching to a ventilator capable of providing
increased support; namely, switching from a basic ventilator to a full-featured
ventilator—with COVID-19, oxygenation or high-precise FiO2 is a central concern.
Such a patient would be subject to the same triage process as anyone else for the fullfeatured ventilator, so they may or may not receive the needed ventilator in the end.
How likely this scenario is will depend on (1) whether the PV really cannot
provide the needed support and (2) how close the hospital is to CSC. Long-term
ventilator users often have specialized expertise in how to adjust their ventilators for
changing needs, so healthcare professionals should partner with these patients and
share their own expertise as much as possible early in admission. If the triage criteria
are such that the patient might not receive the full-featured ventilator, this may or
may not be equitable allocation depending on the criteria and one’s conception of
equity, which is unfortunately outside the scope of this paper.
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As physicians and scientists have more time and data points to understand the
trajectory of the novel coronavirus, they may determine that they can provide more
and better care without relying so heavily on ventilators. Although less-invasive
methods such as BiPAP (Bilevel Positive Airway Pressure) and CPAP (Continuous
Positive Airway Pressure) may aerosolize secretions and pose risk to healthcare
workers and other patients, high-flow nasal cannula could be as effective as
intubation and mechanical ventilation yet without the many harmful side effects
from long-term intubation.
As relevant as those facts are, the import of our analysis holds even if it is
determined that ventilator use is ineffective for the COIVD-19 pandemic. Our
arguments that the practice of PVR should be denied in all cases do not turn on
the effectiveness of ventilators in CSC, but upon the ethical considerations of the
experience of PV use. Furthermore, we have not provided an argument deduced
from principles—whether nonmaleficence, beneficence, efficiency, efficacy, the
public good, or what have you—but instead, an argument from the moral claims
that arise from how people experience their lives.
We take the further implications of our arguments to extend to at least the
following two claims. First, insofar as healthcare systems aim to both form a
productive partnership with disability communities and also aim to deliver just
and equitable care for patient populations at large, decision-making and deliberation concerning both policies and day-to-day clinical dilemmas should involve
disability perspectives. Ideally, this should come from people inside of disability
communities and, where that is impossible, disability allies and advocates. The
integration of the perspective, experiences, and reflections of people with disabilities
will only improve the ideal of just and equitable delivery of healthcare.40
Second, the moral distinction for which we have argued here, based as it is upon
the lived experience of PV users, displays the broader analytic and clinical import of
analysis grounded in first-person as opposed to merely third-person analysis.
Third-person analyses arising from domains ranging from clinical biomedical
research to quantitative sociology are profoundly valuable. We find, however, that
they are significantly bolstered, especially with respect to ethical considerations,
when supported and/or amended by first-person perspectives arising from phenomenological and other forms of qualitative analysis.
Furthermore, we contend that certain biomedical dilemmas, specifically with
respect to their normative dimensions, will be poorly addressed except insofar as
they are ultimately grounded in the latter and not the former. It is in light of these
considerations that we argue that taking away someone’s PV is a direct assault on
their bodily and social integrity, that PVs should not be part of reallocation pools,
and that triage protocols should be immediately clarified and explicitly state that
PVs will be protected in all cases.
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